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Abstract—Anomaly Intrusion Detection System (IDS) is a 
statistical based network IDS which can detect attack variants 
and novel attacks without a priori knowledge. Current 
anomaly IDSs are inefficient for real-time detection because of 
their complex computation. This paper proposes a novel 
approach to reduce the heavy computational cost of an 
anomaly IDS. Linear Discriminant Analysis (LDA) and 
difference distance map are used for selection of significant 
features. This approach is able to transform high-dimensional 
feature vectors into a low-dimensional domain. The similarity 
between new incoming packets and a normal profile is 
determined using Euclidean distance on the simple, low-
dimensional feature domain. The final decision will be made 
according to a pre-calculated threshold to differentiate normal 
and abnormal network packets. The proposed approach is 
evaluated using DARPA 1999 IDS dataset. 
Keywords-linear discriminant analysis; feature selection; 
packet payload;  network intrusion detection; Euclidean distance 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
As the popularity of computer network, increasing 
numbers of transactions have been relocated to network 
environment. Although this has provided convenience and 
flexibility to business and human daily life, it has also 
provided a platform for network criminals and attacks. It was 
reported that 32,956 vulnerabilities were found through 1995 
until the first quarter of 2007 [1], and there was at least one 
new attack spotted every hours [2]. Therefore, network 
security has been widely concerned by both industry and 
research sectors. 
To prevent a system from being compromised, Intrusion 
Detection System (IDS) has become an active research area 
since it was first introduced in 1980s [3]. Despite advances 
in intrusion detection, the existing computing infrastructures 
are still vulnerable to network attacks. This is partially 
because the most widely used commercial IDSs are misuse-
based systems [4][5] and are configured with known attack 
signatures. They are only effective to the malicious 
behaviors with the known attack patterns and easy to be 
evaded by novel attacks. Moreover, it is difficult to keep 
intrusion detection signature sets updated due to the 
increasing number of continuously discovered 
vulnerabilities.  
Comparatively, anomaly-based IDSs [6][7] has been 
proven to be more promising for detection of novel attacks 
and attack variations. The systems learn normal network 
traffic behaviors from a set of training data and develop a 
profile for the normal behaviors. Any deviation of the 
incoming event profile with respect to the normal profile is 
considered as anomaly. However, these systems have 
relatively higher rates of false positives. Thus, in recent 
years, many studies as shown in [8][9][10][11][12] have 
been conducted to reduce the high false positive rates, but 
these approaches have introduced complex, statistical 
computation in both training and detection phases and have 
hence caused heavy consumption on system resources and 
computational power. Therefore, feature reduction becomes 
essential to create an effective anomaly-based IDS when 
taking into account the computational complexity and 
classification performance.  
There have been various feature reduction techniques, 
such as Correlation-based Feature Selection (CFS), Support 
Vector Machine (SVM), Principal Component Analysis 
(PCA), Independent Component Analysis (ICA), PCA-ICA, 
Generalized Discriminant Analysis (GDA) and Linear 
Discriminant Analysis (LDA), that were discussed and 
proposed [13][14][15][16][17][18] to reduce the header 
features of packets. However, there are very few papers that 
have considered feature selection according to application-
layer payload. 
The early feature reduction approach [19] on payload, 
developed by Krugel et al., grouped the byte frequency 
distributions of 256 ASCII characters into six bins, namely 0, 
1-3, 4-6, 7-11, 12-15 and 16-255. Wang et al. [20] proposed 
an Anagram detector, in which Bloom Filter (BF) was used 
to reduce memory overhead. Nwanze and Summerville 
proposed a lightweight payload inspection approach [21], 
where bit-pattern hash functions were employed to map the 
bytes at the packet payload onto a set of counters which were 
the selected features used for intrusion detection. 
All existing approaches for feature reduction fail to 
consider one of the important payload characteristics, i.e., the 
correlations among the payload features (ASCII characters). 
The characters in malicious packet payloads present different 
correlations from those in normal packet payloads. 
Geometrical Structure Anomaly Detection (GSAD) 
model was proposed in [22], which considered the character 
correlation. GSAD is based on a pattern recognition 
technique used in image processing, and the model analyses 
the correlations among ASCII characters in packet payload 
using the Mahalanobis Distance Map (MDM). GSAD model 
is proven to have good performance for intrusion detection 
with low false positive rates and high detection rates. 
However, because GSAD uses 256
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 features to evaluate and 
looks for intrusive patterns in a network packet, it creates 
massive computational complexity.   
In this paper, we propose an approach using LDA for 
feature selection. This approach reduces the computational 
complexity dramatically while retaining the high detection 
rates. To our best knowledge, LDA has not been considered 
in other related researches for payload-based feature 
selection. Furthermore, this approach uses a difference 
distance map to order the potential features for feature 
selection. 
This paper is structured as follows. Section II briefly 
describes the basic concepts of LDA. Section III gives a 
detailed explanation of LDA-based feature selection 
approach for intrusion detection. In Section IV, experimental 
results are given and analysed. Section V draws conclusions 
and future work. 
II. LINEAR DISCRIMINANT ANALYSIS  
LDA [23] is one of the commonly used dimensionality 
reduction and data classification techniques and has been 
applied in human detection [24], face recognition, speech 
recognition, marketing research, bankruptcy prediction and 
network intrusion detection [15][17] etc.  
Different from PCA, which extracts features that are the 
most efficient for representation but may not be useful for 
discrimination, LDA selects an optimal projection matrix to 
transform a higher dimensional feature domain to a lower 
dimensional space while preserving the significant 
information for data classification. We suppose that there is a 
set of n d-dimensional samples {x1, …, xn} assigned to k 
different classes. Each class Ci, where i = 1, …, k, has ni 
samples. Projection matrix Ar is found to maximize the 
between-class scatter matrix 
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and minimize the within-class scatter matrix 
                    
 
    
 
   , 
where μ is the sample mean of the whole sample set denoted 
by 
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and μi is the sample mean for class Ci given by 
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Thus, the ratio, J, between the between-class scatter 
matrix SB and the within-class scatter matrix SW can be easily 
maximized by the projection matrix Ar. 
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Once the above optimization problem is solved, the 
classification decision can be easily made on the low 
dimensional feature space by projecting the original feature 
space onto the optimal projection matrix Ar. 
III. LDA BASED INTRUSION DETECTION SYSTEM 
In this paper, LDA is used to select significant features 
from a Mahalanobis Distance Map (MDM), which is 
generated by the Geometrical Structure Model (GSM) [22], a 
key component of the GSAD, for each single network packet 
to explore the correlations among features (ASCII characters) 
in a packet payload. Then, the final detection process can be 
fast conducted on a new low-dimensional domain.  
To extract the low-dimensional significant features, 
difference distance maps need to be generated to measure the 
difference between normal traffic and particular types of 
attack traffic, such as the difference between each pair of 
<Normal, Phf attack>, <Normal, Back attack> and <Normal, 
Apache2 attack>. Afterwards, LDA is employed to select the 
most signification features for each normal and attack pair 
based on the pre-generated difference distance maps. Finally, 
all of the selected features are integrated into a new 
significant feature set used for normal profile development 
and malicious behavior detection. The detailed explanation is 
given in the following subsections. 
A. Feature Selection Using  LDA 
For the selection of the most significant features, labeled 
training samples are required and randomly chosen from a 
normal sample set and various attack sample sets. The 
techniques shown in [22] are applied to generate MDMs 
using the training samples.   
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       denote the MDMs of all (m) normal 
samples and (n) attack samples respectively.  
1) Difference distance map 
In order to discover the difference between the normal 
and attack samples, a difference distance map is utilized. We 
calculate the difference at each element (i, j), where i, j = 0, 
…, 255, between the MDMs of the normal samples and the 
attack samples using Equations (6) to (10) below.  
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In Equations (6) to (10),       
        
 stands for the (i, j)-th 
element of MDM of the k-th normal sample,       
        
 stands 
for the (i, j)-th element of MDM of the k-th attack 
sample,         
       and             
 denote the mean and the 
variance of the (i, j)-th elements of the normal sample 
MDMs, and        
       and             
  denote the mean and the 
variance of the (i, j)-th elements of the attack sample MDMs. 
The difference at element (i, j) between the normal samples 
and the attack samples is denoted by          and computed 
by Equation (10). The difference distance map between the 
normal samples and the attack samples is defined by 
                        
. A difference distance map is 
generated for each pair of normal traffic and particular type 
of attack traffic, and will be used for the selection of 
significant features. 
Because the dimension of the difference distance map is 
large, it is very time consuming if the map is directly used to 
differentiate the normal traffic and the attack traffic. 
Therefore, we propose to use LDA for feature selection (i.e., 
to reduce the dimension of the map).  
2) LDA-based feature selection 
In the difference distance map, the larger a feature (i.e., a 
matrix element) is, the more important the feature is to 
discriminate attack traffic from normal traffic. We first select 
the most significant r features from the difference distance 
map. The element locations of these features in the 
difference distance map determine the element locations in 
every MDM of a normal or an attack sample to form a 
corresponding r dimensional distance vector represented by 
Dr,k = [dk(Ur,1 ,Vr,1), dk(Ur,2 ,Vr,2), …, dk(Ur,r ,Vr,r)]
T
, where (Ur,1, Vr,1), 
(Ur,2, Vr,2), …, (Ur,r, Vr,r) indicate the element locations of the 
largest r features in the difference distance map, r is ranged 
from 1 to  256
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 and k indicates the k-th sample. Let     
       
and    
      represent the Dr,k of the k-th normal sample and 
the k-th attack sample respectively. Then, the projection 
vector Ar is computed by 
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where   
       and   
       are the averages of     
       
and     
      , and    
       and    
       are the 
covariances of     
       and    
      . The whole process will 
be conducted iteratively until the number of significant 
features reaches the pre-set value, and the final projection 
matrix Ar will be determined. Once the projection vector is 
finalized, the corresponding final set of features is 
considered as the most significant features.  
The above is the feature selection process in this paper 
for detection of each type of attack. For all types of attacks, 
we need to combine the selected features into a new 
significant feature set, which is used for normal profile 
development and malicious behavior detection. 
B. Normal Profile Development 
The normal profile is utilized to detect the similarity 
between the normal behavior and new incoming packet. It is 
developed by using the normal training samples and the 
selected significant feature set. In this section, we explain 
how to perform the development of the normal profile.  
Mean values of the significant r features of all normal 
training samples and a detection threshold are the basic 
components of the normal profile. Given a set of normal 
training samples X = {x1, …, xm}, which have been applied in 
the feature selection phase, and the significant feature set Fk 
= [fk(U1 ,V1), fk(U2 ,V2), …, fk(Ur ,Vr)]
T
, in which (U1, V1), (U2, 
V2), …, (Ur, Vr) indicate the locations of the significant r 
features and k indicates the k-th sample. The mean values are 
denoted by 
   
 
 
   
 
   , 
and they are stored in the normal profile used for comparing 
with any new incoming packet. Threshold is another 
important component to consider. Without an appropriate 
criterion, it is hard to achieve a satisfactory detection 
performance. The larger the threshold value is, the less false 
positive alarm is generated. On the other hand, smaller 
threshold will in turn create a higher detection rate.  
In this paper, we select a threshold through a distribution 
analysis of the Euclidean distance between each normal 
training sample and the mean value  . The Euclidean 
distance from the k-th normal training sample to the mean 
value   is computed by  
                         
               
        
         is the (Ui, Vi)-th element of  . The standard deviation 
of the Euclidean distances from the k-th normal training 
sample to the mean value    of the normal training samples 
is  
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where        
 
 
    
 
    .We assume that the distance     
is of normal distribution, so three standard deviations 
account for 99% of the sample population.  
C. Attack Recognition 
Similar to the normal profile development process, for 
any new incoming packet, the GSM is applied to generate 
the MDM of the packet. Then, the most significant r features 
are collected to form a feature vector F from the MDM. 
Afterwards, the Euclidean distance between F and   is 
calculated using Equation (13). The incoming packet is 
considered as an attack or a threat if and only if the 
Euclidean distance from F to   is greater than +3δ or smaller 
than -3δ, where δ is the standard deviation computed by 
Equation (14).  
Compared with the pure GSAD model in [22], the 
approach in this paper uses only the selected significant 
features for discriminating the normal traffic from the attack 
traffic. It avoids the heavy computational complexity without 
using all 256
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 features in an MDM. 
IV. EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS AND ANALYSIS 
Experimental results are presented and analysed in this 
section. We evaluate the LDA feature selection approach on 
the DARPA 1999 IDS dataset [25], which contains five-
week network traffic recorded in tcpdump format. Week 1 
and week 3 data are attack-free data, and the other three-
week data contain both normal and attack network traffic. 
The DARPA 1999 dataset consists of five main categories of 
attacks including scan or probe, DoS, R2L, U2R and data. 
A. Experimental Results 
In our experiments, we consider inbound HTTP traffic 
only. HTTP-based attacks are mainly from the HTTP GET 
request at the server side. We use the same conditions as the 
[22] did. The LDA-based IDS is trained and tested with the 
inbound HTTP GET request traffic carrying payload 
extracted on week 4 (5 days) and week 5 (5 days). The 
extracted HTTP traffic packets corresponding to HTTP 
service are destined to two different HTTP servers existing 
in DARPA 1999 dataset: marx (Linux Server with IP address 
172.16.114.50) and hume (NT Server with IP address 
172.16.112.100). The total numbers of packets after filtering 
are 783,443 for marx, and 8431 for hume hosts respectively.  
Then, we further filter the normal and attack HTTP GET 
request packets, and divide them into normal and attack 
datasets respectively. We randomly choose 300 normal 
packets and 900 attack packets for feature selection, and 
choose another 300 packets for normal model training. 
Finally, we randomly select 1000 normal packets and 3000 
attack packets from the remaining for test. The attack packets 
contain Apache2 attack, Back attack and Phf attack.  
In the feature selection stage, the signification features 
are selected using the randomly chosen 300 normal packets 
and 900 attack packets for each type of attack according to 
the process discussed in Section III A. The normal model of 
LDA-based IDS is trained on the 300 training packets given 
in Section III B. 
  
(a) Normal HTTP packet 
 
(b) Phf attack packet 
Figure 1.  Average Mahalanobis distance maps of normal HTTP and Phf 
attack packets 
 
Figure 2.  Difference distance map between normal HTTP and Phf attack 
packets 
TABLE I.  CONFUSION MATRIX FOR LDA-BASED IDS 
Predicted 
Actual 
Normal Attack %Correct 
Normal 963 37 96.3 
Attack 0 3000 100 
% Correct 100 98.78  
Figs. 1(a) and (b) show the average MDMs of the normal 
HTTP samples and the Phf attack samples, and the 
difference distance map is shown in Fig 2. There are totally 
256
2
 features in each of the average MDMs and the 
difference distance map. As can be seen from the following 
figures, those normal and attack samples present clearly 
different behaviors. 
We conduct several experiments to extract the optimal 
number of significant features to best separate normal 
packets from attack packets. The optimal result is found to 
be 100 features selected by LDA for each of three types of 
attacks. Then, the normal profile is developed based on the 
combined 300 significant features. 
In the test stage, the trained LDA-based IDS is evaluated 
on the testing dataset containing both the normal packets and 
the attack packets. The results are shown in Table I. A 
detailed analysis is given in the next subsection. 
B. Experimental Analysis 
The results in Table I reveal that the 300 optimally 
selected significant features can well differentiate the attack 
packets from the normal packets. In this section, the 
information contained in the confusion matrix is further 
analysed using Detection Rate (DR) and False Positive Rate 
(FPR). We introduce evaluation metrics for the analysis. The 
metrics used are True Positive (TP), True Negative (TN), 
False Positive (FP) and False Negative (FN). 
 TP: the number of actual attack classified as attack 
 TN: the number of actual normal classified as normal 
 FP: the number of actual normal classified as attack 
 FN: the number of actual attack classified as normal 
The Detection Rate is given by    
  
     
     . 
The False Positive Rate is given by     
  
     
     . 
According the information given by Table I, the detection 
rate and the false positive rate are calculated and compared 
with GSAD [26] and PAYL. The results are shown in Table 
II. 
TABLE II.  PERFORMANCE COMPARISON OF VARIOUS IDSS 
Systems Number of 
Features 
Detection 
Rate (DR%) 
False Positive 
Rate (FPR%) 
LDA-based IDS 300 100 3.7 
GSAD 2562 100 0.087 
PAYL 256 98 0.1 
The experimental results demonstrate that not all the 
features in MDM are essential for the detection of network 
attacks, and the observed packets can be classified using only 
a small number of significant features.  
The proposed LDA-based feature selection approach is 
proven to be a good candidate for achieving the above 
mentioned task. It successfully transforms the original 256
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dimensional feature domain to a relatively very low 
dimensional feature space while preserving the most 
significant information for the final detection. The features in 
the selected low dimensional feature space represent the 
most significant difference between the normal packets and 
the attack packets. By making use of the proposed LDA-
based feature selection approach, we can not only 
significantly reduce the computational complexity of the 
detection process but also keep high detection rate.  
V. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK 
This paper has proposed a LDA-based feature selection 
approach to reduce the computational cost of payload based 
anomaly IDS in attack detection. It is the first time that LDA 
is considered for payload-based feature selection. The 
approach not only extracts a set of low-dimensional features 
but also preserves most of the signification information for 
data classification 
 The proposed approach has been evaluated using 
DARPA 1999 IDS dataset and tested on HTTP traffic. It has 
achieved encouraging results with 100% detection rate and 
3.7% false positive rate. However, the amount of selected 
significant features may grow to a large number when more 
types of attacks are considered. This is because more sets of 
significant features will be selected with respect to the 
increasing number of types of attacks. If there are not 
common features within the different sets of significant 
features, all of the features will be combined together and the 
number will multiply. Thus, we attempt to solve this issue by 
developing a fixed length identical significant feature set. 
Also, we will extend this research work to other attacks, e.g., 
Code-red worm, DDK and shell code attacks, as well as to 
other application-layer protocols, such as DNS, mail system 
etc. 
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